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II KISDM MONALSIATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001). The Utah
Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs' Petition for Permission to Appeal the district court's
interlocutory order and transferred the case to this court. (Order dated August 23, 2002; see also
Letter from Court of Appeals R. 197.)
STATEMENT < H I ill I SSI E
Before the court is whether the district court correctly held that state legislation prohibits
bicyclists from riding against traffic and that any municipal ordinance that purports to permit
otherwise is in conflict with the state legislation and therefore invalid.
The district court's ruling on the parties7 motions for partial summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95,ffl[4-5, _ P.3d _ .
(indicating that a district court's ruling on motions for partial summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness).
The issue was preserved for appeal by virtue of the district court ruling on the crossmotions for partial summary judgment. (Minute Entry (R. 162-166).)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the interpretation of state legislation and its relation to a conflicting
municipal ordinance. The district court held that state statutory law requires bicyclists to ride
with, not against traffic, and that any city ordinance to the contrary purporting to permit
bicyclists in a bicycle lane to ride against traffic is invalid. The Nature Conservancy submits that
the district court's decision should be affirmed.
The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff Tyler Hansen ("Hansen") and Defendant Amanda
1

Eyre ("Eyre") were involved in an automobile/bicycle accident at the intersection of 200 South
and 500 East in Salt Lake City on February 17, 2000. Eyre, an employee of The Nature
Conservancy ("Nature Conservancy"), was traveling southbound on 500 East in her car. She
stopped at a red light. Hansen, a bicycle messenger, was riding his bicycle east on 200 South.
Hansen was riding his bicycle in a bicycle lane, but against the flow of traffic, and in the bicycle
lane on the left-hand side of the street instead of the bicycle lane on the right-hand side of the
street. Hansen had initially proceeded eastbound in the bicycle lane on the right-hand side of the
street, and with the flow of traffic. However, before colliding with Eyre. Hansen had crossed the
street in the middle of the block west of the intersection. Hansen then continued eastbound
against traffic, in the north-side bicycle lane until he arrived at the intersection where he and Eyre
collided. Eyre, after stopping at the red light, was beginning her right-hand turn, westbound,
when she collided with Hansen who was in the bicycle lane but traveling against traffic.
Plaintiffs filed suit claiming Eyre was negligent because she violated sections of the Utah
Code and various Salt Lake City Ordinances in colliding with Hansen. (Compl. (R. 1-4);
Amended Compl. and Request for Jury (R. 5-7); Second Am. Compl. (R. 18-21).) Plaintiffs
subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Mot. Partial Summ. J. (R. 45).)
This motion was denied, with the court granting Eyre a continuance to conduct discovery
pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Notice of Decision (R. 72).)
Following the court's decision, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs
alleged the same legal theory against Eyre, but they added Nature Conservancy as a defendant,
claiming Eyre was acting in the course of her employment when she and Hansen collided.
(Third Am. Compl. (R. 81-84).)
2

Defendant Nature Conservancy filed a motion for partial summary'judgment. (Cross-Mot.
for Partial Summ. J. (R. 107-08).) At the same time, Nature Conservancy also opposed
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment.1 (Mem. in Opp'n to Pis/ Mot. for Partial
Summ. J. and In Support of Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (R. 109-126).) Nature Conservancy
asked the court to "hold as a matter of law that plaintiff violated Utah Code Annotated §§41-687 & 41-6-87.5 by riding his bicycle on the left-hand side of the highway, against the designated
flow of traffic." (Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (R. 107).) Nature Conservancy also argued
that irrespective of the Salt Lake City Ordinance, the Utah Code prohibits bicyclists from riding
in a left-hand bicycle lane against traffic. (Mem. in Opp'n to Pis/ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. and
In Support of Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (R. 109-126).) Consequently, Nature
Conservancy argued, the Salt Lake City Ordinance conflicts with state law, and is therefore
invalid. (Id.) Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and at the same time, renewed their motion for
partial summary judgment. (Renewed Mot. Partial Summ. J. (R. 139-40).) Plaintiffs argued that
under Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1), Hansen was entitled to ride his bicycle against the
flow of traffic because he was in a designated bicycle lane. (Response to Cross Mot. of Def,
The Nature Conservancy, for Partial Summ. J. and Mem. in Support of Renewed Mot. for Partial
Summ. J. (R. 132-138)). Plaintiffs further professed that the ordinance did not conflict with state
legislation. (Id.)
The district court denied both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' motions for partial summary

1

Defendant Eyre joined The Nature Conservancy's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and its Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (Joinder in
the Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 127-28)).
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judgment. (Minute Entry (R. 162-166).) In denying Plaintiffs' motion, the district court
determined that state statutory law requires bicyclists to ride with traffic, and that any city
ordinance that purports to allow otherwise violates the state Motor Vehicle Code. (Id. at 164.)
The district court rejected Plaintiffs' contention that the city ordinance is an exception to the state
statute. Instead, the district court explained that local ordinances may regulate matters already
covered by state law. but only if "the ordinance in no way conflicts with existing state law;' (Id.
at 164 (quotation without citation in original)); see Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998
Replacement Vol.); Walker v. Union Pac. R.R., 844 P.2d 335, 339 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The
district court then went on to hold that "state law was and is . . . clear that bicycles are to ride in
the direction of motor vehicle traffic," and that "[a]n ordinance that purports to allow otherwise
is in conflict with such state law." (Id at 164.) The district court further stated, "more
importantly, it is directly against the Utah statute to travel by bicycle against the flow of vehicle
traffic." (Id. at 164.) In so holding, the court denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment.
Plaintiffs petitioned the supreme court for permission to appeal this interlocutory order.
(Pet. for Permission to Appeal (R. 175-192.) The supreme court granted Plaintiffs' petition and
subsequently transferred the case to this court pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(4). (Order
dated August 23, 2002; see also Letter from Court of Appeals R. 197.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.
State legislation, particularly Utah Code section 41-6-87, requires bicyclists to ride with, not
against, traffic even when the bicyclist is in a marked bicycle lane. Salt Lake City Ordinance
4

12.80.070(1) purports to allow bicyclists to ride against traffic when in a marked bicycle lane.
Because the ordinance conflicts with the state legislation, the ordinance is invalid. Accordingly,
the district court correctly determined that state legislation prohibited bicycling against the flow
of traffic and that any ordinance purporting to allow otherwise, Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.80.070 here, is in conflict with state law. As a result, the decision of the district court should
be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I. The District Court Correctly Held that the Utah Code Requires Bicyclists to Ride with
Traffic; Because the Salt Lake City Ordinance Purports to Allow Otherwise, it is in
Conflict with State Law and therefore Invalid
The state statutory provisions governing the operation of bicycles on roadways prohibit
riding against traffic. The Salt Lake City Ordinance purporting to permit a bicyclist to ride
against traffic in a marked bicycle lane conflicts with this statutory rule. Accordingly, pursuant
to state law, the Salt Lake City Ordinance is invalid. As a result, the trial court's decision
denying the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was correct and should be affirmed.
Plaintiffs point out that the state legislature authorized municipalities to enact ordinances
that regulate the operation of bicycles. Plaintiffs noticeably fail to point out, however, that such
authority exists only to the extent that the ordinances do not conflict with state legislation.
Ordinances that conflict with state statutes are invalid. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-16 & -17
(1998 Replacement Vol.).
Section 41-6-17 reads, in relevant part:
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local authorities, with respect to
highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of police power,
from:
5

(h) regulating the operation of bicycles
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-17 (1998 Replacement Vol.) (amended 2001).2 However, section 41-616 reads:
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this state
and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority may
not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this
chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent with this
chapter, and additional traffic ordinances which are not in conflict with this
chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 Replacement Vol.) (amended 2001) (emphasis added).' Thus,
while the state legislature gave Salt Lake City authority to promulgate ordinances regulating the
operation of bicycles, the legislature simultaneously prohibited any Salt Lake City ordinances
that conflict with state statutes. Municipal ordinances that conflict in any way with state statutes
are invalid. See Walker v. Union Pac. R.R., 844 P.2d 335, 339 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Utah
permits local governments to legislate by ordinance those subjects already covered by state
legislation, provided (1) the state has not foreclosed municipal legislation of the subject, and (2)
'the ordinance in no way conflicts with existing state law.'" (quoting Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake
City ComnTn, 624 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Utah 1981)); Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 97, 102; 85
P.2d 802, 804 (1938) (explaining the principle that a municipal ordinance dealing with the same

1

Nature Conservancy cites the statutes in effect at the time of the accident and notes their
subsequent amendments parenthetically.
3

This statute repudiates Plaintiffs' suggestion that "no Utah authority [exists] dealing
specifically with the issue of whether such an ordinance is within the power delegated to cities to
regulate bicycle traffic," (Brief of Appellant at 17), and it contradicts Plaintiffs' claim that "there
is no justifiable basis for arguing that Salt Lake City has exceeded the authority to regulate the
operation of bicycles in the City granted by Section 41-6-17(l)(h)." (Brief of Appellant at 19.)
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subject matter as a state statute is

by or inconsistent with the statute), affd

onielLg, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938).
The question, therefore, is whether Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.<H> i ^ no iilid IHO an t
it conflicts in any way with sectic

!

he Utah Code. In determining whether an

ordinance is in 'conflict' with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses
that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa." Kusse, 97 I i;ih H <H K"S P 'd .n
804 (citatioi i omitted), affdonreh a. *>'-' i 'i 5h. 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938); see also Walker, 844
P.2d at 340 (holding that an ordinance which purported to prohibit an activity pemiitted by the
statute conflicted with the statute and was therefore pi e c =; i P . .

• o • - o< | n o»•• •

rdinance

permits that w Inch 1 he statute prohibits, the ordinance conflicts with the statute and is invalid.
See Walker, 844 P.2d at 340; Kusse, 97 Utah at 102, 85 P.2d at 804. Nature Conservancy
submits that the ordinance is invalid because it conflicts wiili section 11 -o-S"7 ihe ordinance
purports to permit what the statute prohibits-bicycling against the flow of traffic.
The statutory provisions, when read together and in light of the statute's intent to pi oiilote
bicycle safety, clearly prohibit bicyclists from riding agair

- \,yw even when bicycle lanes are

present. The version of Utah Code section 41-6-87 in effect at the time of the accident read, in
relevant part, as follows:
(1) a person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway at less than the
normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then
existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway
except when:
(a) overtaking and passing anome: MC •. - • M*« • - proceeding in the
same direction;
(b) preparing to make a left hand turn at an intersection or into a private
road or driveway; or
(c) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions including, but not limited to,
7

fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestrians,
animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that make it unsafe to
continue along the right-hand edge. . . .
(3) If a useable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway, bicycle
riders shall use the path and not the roadway.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87 (1998 Replacement Vol.) (amended 2001). For the reasons which
follow, based upon the language of the statute and the legislative intent and purpose of
promoting bicycle safety, this statute requires bicyclists to ride with traffic, even when a bicycle
lane exists.
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. To discover that intent, one looks first to
the plain language of the statute. In construing the language of the statute, one must also assume
that each statutory term was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless
such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable. Harmon City. Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior,
907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995).- If a provision causes doubt or uncertainty in its application,
the act is then analyzed in its entirety, and the provisions of the act are harmonized in accordance
with the legislative intent and purpose. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah
1980)). The intent of the legislature in enacting laws that regulate the operation of bicycles,
particularly section 41-6-87, is public safety. See Greaves v. State. 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah
1974) (noting that the purpose of the Utah Motor Vehicle Code is to govern safety of the use and
operation of motor vehicles); Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 491, 243 P.2d 747, 750 (1952)
(noting that the purpose of traffic regulation is to facilitate efficient use of the streets consistent
with safety and that safety is the first and most important consideration): Dixon v. Bergin, 64

'

'

-8,

Utah 195, 204-05, 228 P.2d 744, 748 (1.924) (n. lei iti< )nii ig tl uit traffic i :gulatioi is have been
adopted for the convenience and safety of all who may use the streets).4 When analyzed in their
entirety and harmonized in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose, the provisions of
section 41-6-87 prohibit bicycling against traffic, even in a marked bicycle lane.
I lie language of the statutory provisions reflects the legislative intent to provide for the
safety of all those who use public roads, including bicyclists. The general rule enacted by the
state legisiatureprovid.es that bicycles must be ridden "as near as praciinible i<> (lie n^hl-hand
edge of the roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1) (1998 Replacement Vol.) (amended 2001).
This rule contributes to the safety of the bicyclists by creating two requirements. First, bicyclists
must ride near the edge of tl le i oadway, oi itside of the flow ot automobile traffic. Second,
bicyclists must ride on the right-hand side of the street; the language "right-hand edge" requires
bicyclists ride with the flow of traffic, not against it, ()h :oi. u . \\\c .egislature's intent in
passing this legislation was to promote bicycle safety. '.
In enacting this general rule that bicyclists must ride on the right-hand edge of the street,
the state legislature also outlined three exceptions. The exceptioi is prnnil a birvelisl lo ride
away from the edge of the road i mder certain circumstances. The exceptions do not, however,
exempt a rider from riding with traffic on the right-hand side of the road. The exceptions explain
that the bicyclist need not ride as close as possum

.•.-•':.

•"* '.ung

and passing another bicycle or vehicle proceeding in the same direction; (b) preparing to make a

4

Section 41-6-87 is part of article 11 (Bicycles, Regulation of Operation), which is part
of chapter 6 (Traffic Rules and Regulations) of Title 41 of the Utah Code, the Utah Motor
Vehicle Act.
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left hand turn at an intersection or into a private road or driveway; or (c) reasonably necessary to
avoid conditions including, but not limited to, fixed or moving objects, parked or moving
vehicles, bicycles, pedestrians, animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that make it
unsafe to continue along the right-hand edge." Id. at § 41-6-87(1). While these exceptions
permit a bicyclist to move away from the right-hand edge, they do not permit a bicyclist to ride
against traffic.
The first exception permits a bicyclist to stray away from the edge of the road to pass
another vehicle. It does not suggest, however, that the bicyclist is no longer required to remain
on the right-hand side of the road. The second exception permits a bicyclist to move away from
the edge of the road to make a left-hand turn. The bicyclist must still comply with traffic
regulations, however. This exception does not suggest that a bicyclist can leave the right-hand
side of the roadway, cross over into oncoming traffic, and then ride against that traffic before
making a left-hand turn. The exception permits, for example, a bicyclist to move from the righthand edge of the road into a left-hand turn lane when such a lane is available, and then turn left
as other vehicles do. The exception does not, however, permit a bicyclist to cross the street midblock and ride against oncoming traffic before turning left onto an intersecting street. The third
exception permits a bicyclist to drift from the edge of the roadway when necessary in order to
avoid hazards. The exception does not permit a bicyclist to ride against traffic on the left-hand
side of the road, however. The bicyclist should avoid hazards and then resume riding as near as
practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway. The language of these exceptions, particularly
exception (c), clearly reflects the statute's purpose of promoting bicycle safety.
In sum, the statutory exceptions in subsection (1) do not suggest that the requirement to
10

ride with traffic may be suspended or excepted. The three exceptions permit a bicyclist to move
away from the edge of the road under particular circumstances. However, the exceptions still do
not permit a bicyclist to ride against traffic, i-.ven when following an exception, a bicyclist must
still ndc on the right-hand side of the roadway, with the flow of traffic. Any exception to this
requirement to ride with traffic would be contrary to the statutory intent and purpose.
I:inally. the state legislature JIM-,iix" i

.•. i. • .1^ \

provided adjacent to a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway.11 Id. at §
41-6-87(3). As noted previously, this provision must also be read in harmony with the other
provisions and in iign

, . ^ -..•'

•; •

:Ie safety. • Interpreting ; the i i lie

in this light means that when a bicycle lane exists, riders are not required to ride their bicycles as
near as practicable to the right-hand side of the road but instead should ride within the bicycle
lane, in other words, where t

ic exists, 1"tu> iviini- :rent that one ride as near to the

edge of the roadway is suspended. The requirement that riders must ride with the flow of traffic
on the right-hand side of the road is not suspended or excepted, however.
To interpret any statutory or municipal rule to permit riding against traffic, even in a
bicycle lane, would endanger bicyclists and run contrary to the purpose of state legislation
regarding bicycle regulation. Permitting bicyclists to i ide against traffi : woi lid increase the risk
of head on collisions with automobiles. Plus, in circumstances where only one bicycle lane
exists on a roadway, an exception permitting bicyclists to ride in both directions would risk headon bicycle collisions. Moreover, the exact scei lai 10 of tl lis case demonstrates why sue I i a
proposed exception is contrary to the statutory language, intent, and purpose. If bicyclists are
permitted to travel in a left-hand bicycle lane against the flow of traffic, a danger exists when
11

automobile drivers are turning right onto a street with a bicycle path. The automobile driver who
is turning right, after looking left for oncoming automobile traffic, would travel through the
bicycle lane, contrary to oncoming bicycle traffic, to reach the nearest automobile lane. Head on
collisions such as this accident are an obvious risk.
As a result, the statute requires bicyclists to ride with traffic, even when a bicycle lane
exists. When a bicycle lane exists, the requirement to ride near the edge of the road is suspended.
However, the requirement to ride with traffic is not suspended. Bicyclists must still ride on the
right-hand side of the road, with the flow of traffic. Thus, where two bicycle lanes exist on a
roadway-one on each side of the street as is undisputed here—the statute should clearly be
interpreted to require bicyclists to ride with traffic in their respective right-hand bicycle lanes.
To interpret the statute to allow riding against traffic in the left-hand bicycle lane would be
contrary to the safety-oriented purpose of the statute, and a municipal ordinance purporting to
permit such an exception would conflict with the state legislation.
The Salt Lake City ordinance in question purports to permit that which the statute
prohibits-riding against traffic. Accordingly, the ordinance and statute conflict, and the
ordinance is therefore invalid. Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 reads, in pertinent part:
ft is unlawful for operators of bicycles:
(H) When riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to ride upon the
sidewalk or any portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except
when making a left turn;
(I) To ride upon the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a
marked bicycle lane or when riding upon a one-way street.
Ordinance 12.80.070 ostensibly permits a bicyclist in the marked bicycle lane to ride against
traffic under certain circumstances. Subsection (I) directs that a bicyclist may ride upon the left12

hand side of the street, against traffic as long as he or she is within a i narked bicycle lane. 5
However, permitting as much directly conflicts with Utah Code section 41-6-87. For the reasons
outlined previously, section 41-6-87 does not permit a bicyclist to ride against traffic, even in a
bicycle lane.
Subsection (1) of the statute lists three exceptions to the general rule that bicyclists "shall
ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway." Id. at § 41-6-8 )\

'one of

these exec; nons suggests, however, that the requirement to ride with traffic on the right-hand
side of the street is ever suspended or m a y be excepted. Subsection (3) states that "[i]f a useable
path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway, bicycle i it i ::TS shall i ise tl ic pi it.I. i; u ic 1
not the roadway/' Id, at § 41-6-87(3). However, as noted previously, when this provision is read
in harmony with the other provisions and in light of the legislature's intent to promote bicycle
safety, it still does not suggest tl lat bic> clists i i lav ride against traffic, • ::wen in. a bicycle lane.
Subsection (3) directs that when a bicycle lane exists, a bicyclist need not ride as near to the edge
of the roadway; the bicyclist must still ride with traffic, though. Plaintiff Hansen does not satisfy
any of the statutoi y exceptions; and foi the reasons discussed prev ioi isly none of the exceptions

5

Subsection (H) indicates that a bicyclist may ride outside of the bicycle lane to make a
left turn. This provision is in harmony with Utah Code section § 41-6-87( l)(b), though, and
therefore is not at issue despite any indications from Plaintiff to the contrary. Indeed, this
subsection of the ordinance js not at issue because Plaintiffs' admit in their brief that ^Hansen
was not involved in a left turn at the time of the collision" (Brief of Appellant at 16.) Even so,
subsection (H) does not indicate that any rules other than the requirement to travel in the bicycle
lane are excepted in order to turn left. The exception does not permit violating other rulesriding against traffic or on the sidewalk, for example-just because the bicyclist is making a left
turn. To read the exception as broadly as Plaintiffs' suggest such that it permits the plaintiffs'
actions would be contrary to the statutory language, intent, and purpose. It does not permit one
to leave the bicycle lane mid-block, cross over to the left-hand side of the street, and then
proceed against the flow of traffic for the remaining half block before turning left.
13

permits a bicyclist to ride against traffic. Any municipal ordinance purporting to except
bicyclists from the requirement to ride with traffic is contrary to the language, intent, and
purpose of the statute.
In this case, the ordinance permits an activity that is prohibited by the statute. Plaintiffs'
argument that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) is a legal exception to the general statutory
rule that bicyclists must ride on the right-hand side of the road with the flow of traffic is
misplaced. Plaintiffs's assertion that the ordinance is an exception to the statute because "where
two [statutes treat the same subject matter and one of them is general and the other specific, then
the specific provision controls," is inapplicable to this case. (Brief of Appellant at 21.) Because
this case does not deal with conflicting statutes, but with an ordmance in conflict with a statute,
the authority cited by Plaintiffs in support of their assertion is inapposite: Taghipour v. Jerez,
2002 UT 74, 52 P.3d 1252, involves competing state statutes, subsections 48-2b-125(2)(b) and
48-2b-127(2) of the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act. as opposed to a statute in
conflict with a municipal ordinance; J.J.W. v. State, 2001 UT App 271, 33 P.3d 59, involves
competing state statues, the Juvenile Expungement Statute and the Administrative Challenge
Statute, not a statute and a conflicting municipal ordinance; Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23,
997 P.2d 305, involves competing statutory provisions of the Utah Dramshop Act, not a conflict
between a municipal ordinance and a statutory provision; Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770
(Utah 1991), also involves a conflict between two state statutes, the Limitation of Landowner
Liability-Public Recreation Act and its amendments and the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
as opposed to a conflict between a state statute and a municipal ordinance; and Murray City v.
Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), involves a conflict between statutes. Utah Code sections 41-614

44.2 and section 41-6-44

opted verbatii n b; ' Mi u i ay Gt; ' ; u i< i not a coi iflict betwe ::i i

a statute and a municipal ordinance. This case does not involve competing statutes as Plaintiffs
seemingly profess. This case involves a state statute and a conflicting municipal ordinance. Salt
Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) puipnn , |. p iiini i bicu listi." ink HI (IK Ich h.nid nhul
the street, against traffic, as long as he or she is within a marked bicycle lane. The state statute,
on the other hand, prohibits bicyclists from riding against traffic, even when a bicycle lane is
presen

*• ,:H:— - ! \

l

•

•

••

•l

••

*' .-i; 'oiv ^ n , d.

Because the district court held just this in denying Plaintiffs 1 motion for partial summary
judgment, its decision should be affirmed. I he trial court's decision reads, in relevant part:
The court finds that state law was and is (and probably always has been)
clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction of motor vehicle traffic. . .. T h e
court reads [the law] to mean that bicycles are still to ride with traffic, and if there
is a bicycle lane, the bicycles should use the lane rather than the roadway.
Subsection (3) of 41-6-87 does not give license to travel against traffic even in a
bicycle lane.
A n ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with such state law.
[I]t is directly against the Utah statute to travel by bicycle against the
flow of vehicle traffic. Nothing in state law gives any indication that travel by
bicycles against vehicle traffic is approved.
Plaintiffs argue that [t]he trial court declined to rule that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1)
was invalid." (Brief of Appellant at 19; see also id. at 7, 15, 25.) This misconstrues the district
court's decision. Plaintiffs' argument and a ci irsoi v reading of the ciistrict coi irf s decisioi i coi iJixl
lead one to believe that the district court never held that the ordinance and statute were in
conflict. However, a careful examination reveals that this is simply not the case. The district
court held that the state legislation prohibited bicycling against tl i.e flow of traffic. The district
court also held that any ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with state law.
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In denying the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, the district court necessarily
held that the ordinance conflicted with the statute.
Plaintiffs make much of the district court's comments that it was "without any facts (as
pointed out by Plaintifffs] to find that such an ordinance is not within the reasonable police
powers," that it was "not mling on that aspect as it [was] without sufficient facts," and that "[t]he
SLC ordinance thus appears to not be within reasonable police powers to attempt to allow such
dangerous conduct." (Minute Entry (R. at 164)); (Brief of Appellants at 15-17, 19-23.)
However, the court also clearly stated that u[t]hose comments [relating to the police powers
issue], however, are not governing this case." The controlling factor for the district court was
that "more importantly, it is directly against the Utah statute to travel by bicycle against the flow
of traffic." (Minute Entry (R. at 164).) Thus, the district court correctly interpreted Utah Code
section 41-6-87. Further, the district court also correctly determined that "any ordinance that
purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with such state law." (Minute Entry (R. at 164).)
Consequently, by mling that "Plaintiffs'] motion for partial summary judgment is thus denied,"
(Minute Entry (R. at 164)), the district court necessarily held that Salt Lake City Ordinance
10.80.070 was invalid because it conflicted with the state statute.
In sum. the district court correctly held that Utah statutory law requires bicyclists to ride
with the flow of traffic, and that any ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with
such state law. Because Salt Lake City ordinance 12.80.070(1) purports to allow bicyclists to
ride against traffic, it is invalid. The decision of the district court denying Plaintiffs' motion for
partial summary judgment necessarily held that Salt Lake City Ordinance 10.80.070 was invalid
and should be affirmed.
16

: units III ana i \ in Appellants"'' Brief f ail Because they were .
i. > ui Assuming they were Preserved, they Still Fail on their Merits
Points III and IV in Appellants' Brief Fail Because they were Not Preserved for
Appeal
Utah ; ippellate coi 11
. ts "have loi i,g 1 1 laintained that to preserve an issue 0:1 1 appeal a p< 11 ty
must first raise the issue before the trial court." Bair v. Axiom Design. LLC, 2001 UT 20, 1[ 30,
20 P.3d 388 (citing State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985)); see also e.g., Brookside
Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 I 1 Y 48 1' I Ik 48 P.3d 968 (< -xplainii \\ i; the preserv; itic >n
requirement); Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(same). Neither argument was raised before the district court. Plaintiffs ex post facto argument
in Point III was never raised in the district court and was therefore not preserved for appeal.
Likewise, plaintiffs argument in Point IV, that acts done in conformance with an existing law
cannot be negligent, was never raised in t!ie district court and was therefore not preserved either.
Plaintiffs heading for Point III asserts that judicial invalidation of the ordinance should
not permit a conclusion that Hansen acted negligently. Plaintiffs then proceed to argue that
Plaintiff relied 1

!

:•*

<; *

-rke down 1!ie city ordinance "would

make punishable as a crime, conduct that was presumptively lawful under the extant City
Ordinance" and 'Violate rights guaranteed . . . by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of the
United States and Article I, St • '

:

^ of :h. 1 , n^: • =.
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i e ex

post facto laws." (Brief of Appellant at 9-10, 23-25.) This argument was never raised before the
district court, tlioiigl1

I he pleadings submitted by Plaintiffs in conjunction with the motion and

cross-motion for summary judgment do not contain this argument, nor do they even suggest this
argument. Neither Plaintiffs' "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,"
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(which was submitted with Plaintiffs1 initial motion for summary judgment and also incorporated
into Plaintiffs' renewed motion) and its corresponding reply brief; nor Plaintiffs" "Response to
Cross Motion of Defendant, The Nature Conservancy, for Partial Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" and its
corresponding reply brief mention this argument. Consequently, this argument may not be
considered on appeal.
Point IV of Plaintiffs' brief insists that "actions done in conformance with an existing law
are not negligent." (Brief of Appellant at 25-27.) According to Plaintiffs, if one complies with
city ordinances and does not commit a criminal violation, one cannot be negligent. This
argument was also never raised before the district court, but is made for the first time on appeal.
Nowhere in the pleadings submitted by Plaintiffs in conjunction with the motion and crossmotion for summary judgment is this argument made or suggested. Consequently, this court is
precluded from considering this argument on appeal.
B. Even Assuming Points III and IV in Appellants' Brief were Preserved for
Appeal, they Still Fail on their Merits.
Plaintiffs' ex post facto argument is misplaced. The ex post facto authority relied upon
by Plaintiffs is inapplicable to this case. "The protection against ex post facto laws applies only
to criminal punishment, not civil remedies." In re Ennenga, 2001 UT 111. If 18, 37 P.3d 1150;
see also State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, f42-46, 40 P.3d 611 (explaining what constitutes an ex post
facto law). This case is a civil action. Hansen is not being subjected to criminal punishment.
Plaintiffs' argument in Point IV, that acts which comply with city criminal ordinances
cannot be negligent, is simply erroneous. Plaintiffs cite authority defining lawful conduct, but
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they do not cite any authority for the proposition that if one acts lawfully and does not violate a
criminal statute, one cannot be negligent. Plaintiffs do not cite any authority because such
authority does not exist. Simply because one does not commit a crime does not, a fortiori, mean
that one is not negligent. Violation of a criminal safety statute is prima facie negligence in Utah.
See, e.iz.. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998), Intermountain Farmers Ass?n v.
Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Utah 1978), Thompson v. Ford Motor Co.. 16 Utah 2d 30,
33-34, 395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964). It is not axiomatic that "[t]he converse is also true:' (Brief of
Appellant at 26.) It simply does not follow that compliance with criminal statutes and
ordinances precludes a finding of negligence.
CONCLUSION
The district court correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.
State legislation, particularly Utah Code section 41-6-87, requires bicyclists to ride with, not
against, traffic even when the bicyclist is in a marked bicycle lane. Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.80.070(1) purports to allow bicyclists to ride against traffic when in a marked bicycle lane.
Because the ordinance conflicts with the state legislation, the ordinance is invalid. Accordingly,
the district court correctly determined that state legislation prohibited bicycling against the flow
of traffic and that any ordinance purporting to allow otherwise, Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.80.070(1) here, is in conflict with state law. As a result, the decision of the district court
should be affirmed.

19

DATED this

day of _

2002.

STRONG & HANNI
,0

7)

Robert L. Janicki
Michael K. Woolley
Attorneys for Defendant / Appellee
The Nature Conservancy

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the \v)
day of (}(Kjft£Of'
October 2002, two (2)
true and correct copies of the foregoing document were mailed via U.S. mail postage prepaid to
the following:
Edward T. Wells
Mel S. Martin
MEL S. MARTIN P.C.
5282 South Commerce Drive, #D-292
Murray, Utah 84107
Lloyd R. Jones
PETERSEN & HANSEN
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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ADDENDUM

Minute Entry of the District Court
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 Replacement Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-17 (1998 Replacement Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87 (1998 Replacement Vol.)
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070
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IN THE DISTRICT C 0 R T OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND Oi(^S^£f: LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT,
^'fsft&'gg OF UTAH
/;

TYLER HANSEN a/id WORKERS
COMPENSATION (/ FUND,
Plaintiffs,

'

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 010203125

vs.

Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK

AMANDA EYRE and THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY,

Court Clerk: Linda Vance
June 5, 2002

Defendants.
The above matter came before the court on June 5, 2002, on
plaintiff's Motion for partial summary judgment and defendants'
cross motions for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff was present
with counsel Edward T. Wells, defendant Eyre was present through
counsel Lloyd R. Jones, and defendant Nature Conservancy was
present through counsel Robert Janicki.
In this case plaintiff sought partial summary judgment in a
motion filed September 2 6, 2001. The court granted defendant
Eyre's Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance. Defendant Nature
Conservancy was later added as a defendant and on March 28, 2002,
filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant
Eyre joined in that motion. Plaintiff then renewed his motion
for partial summary judgment. Each party responded and the
moving parties each replied.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The following facts do not appear to be in dispute.
This case involves an automobile-bicycle accident at
approximately 200 South and 500 East in Salt Lake City.
Plaintiff was traveling east-bound on 200 South, and at the time
of the accident on the north side of the street, against motor
vehicle traffic, within a marked bicycle lane. The lane is
adjacent to vehicle travel lanes and on the north of the bicycle
lane there is parking spaces for vehicles. He was just west of
500 East, intending to turn north onto 500 East when he was hit
by the vehicle driven by defendant Eyre as she was turning west
onto 200 South after coming from the north, thus being southbound until she began her turn and the bicycle and Eyre's vehicle
collided. Plaintiff was injured and sues Eyre and added her
employer Nature Conservancy.

ANALYSIS
The standards for granting summary judgment are well known
and will not be repeated. Plaintiff asserts that as a matter of
law the court should grant his motion and declare that under a
Salt Lake City Ordinance he had the right to be traveling in the
bicycle lane as he was and he was thus not negligent for doing
so. Defendants assert contrariwise that the SLC Ordinance is in
conflict with State law and thus plaintiff was indeed negligent
for traveling as he was in the eastbound bicycle lane against
vehicular traffic. Defendants thus claim the court should grant
their motion and find plaintiff was negligent.
Various statutes and ordinances come into play. At the time
of the incident in February, 2000, Utah Code Ann. 41-6-87
required bicycles to travel
(1) . . .as near as practicable to the right-hand edge
of the roadway except when:
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an
intersection . . .
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided
adjacent to the roadway, bicycle riders shall use
the path and not the roadway.
U.C.A. 41-6-17 (1) (h) provides that local authorities, "with
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the
reasonable exercise of police power," may "regulate the operation
of bicycles . . ." •
Plaintiff argues he was allowed to travel as he was by an
ordinance, SLC Ordinance, 12.80.070(1) which provided:
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles:
(H) When riding upon a roadway marked
with a bicycle lane to ride upon the
sidewalk or any portion of the roadway
outside the marked bicycle lane except
when making a left turn;
(I) To ride upon the left-hand side of
any street, except when they are within
a marked bicycle lane . . .
Plaintiff thus argues that the court should declare that the
ordinance allows plaintiff to ride in a marked bicycle lane, even
if it is on the left side of the road and going against vehicle
traffic.
Utah law is clear that a local ordinance may be enacted that

covers subjects already covered by state legislation but only if
state law does not foreclose local legislation and "the ordinance
in no way conflicts with existing state law."
The court finds that state law was and is (and probably
always has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction
of motor vehicle traffic. U.C.A. 41-6-87(3) is not to the
contrary. The court reads that statute to mean that bicycles are
still to ride with traffic, and if there is a bicycle lane, the
bicycles should use the lane rather than the roadway. Subsection
(3) of 41-6-87 does not give license to travel against traffic
even in a bicycle lane.
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict
with such state law. Further, any ordinance which is to regulate
bicycle traffic is to be within reasonable police powers under
41-6-17. To allow bicycle riders to ride against traffic, even in
a marked bicycle lane, appears to invite the very sort of
incident that is the subject of this lawsuit. However, the court
is without any facts (as pointed out by plaintiff) to find that
such an ordinance is not within the reasonable police powers.
However, from a common sense standpoint it is well known that the
tendency of most motorists, any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, when they are turning right onto a perpendicular
street, is to look to their left for oncoming traffic, but not to
look to their right. Thus, an ordinance that allows such bicycle
traffic as plaintiff argues may or may not be within the police
powers of the City. The court is not ruling on that aspect as it
is without sufficient facts. Again, however, the ordinance
appears to create problems with bicyclists in the same narrow
lane going in two different directions. It invites dangers to
motorists turning into oncoming bicycle traffic. The SLC
ordinance thus appears to not be within reasonable police powers
to attempt to allow such dangerous conduct. Those comments,
however, are not governing in this case.
However, more importantly, it is directly against the Utah
statute to travel by bicycle against the flow of vehicle traffic.
Nothing in state law gives any indication that travel by bicycles
against vehicle traffic is approved.
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is thus
denied. Defendants' cross motions for partial summary judgment
is, however, also denied. Even if the plaintiff was not
justified by ordinance in riding in the bicycle lane against
vehicle traffic, that does not mean defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The riding conduct is certainly a
factor a trier of fact can consider in determining negligence.
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that
plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic. That will be

one factor in their evaluation of negligence and comparative
negligence. The parties can marshal whatever evidence they have
as to the safety (or lack thereof) of such conduct.
Neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
DATED this
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day of June, 2002.
BY T^/COURT
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Date:
Jun 05, 2002
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-17

41-6-16. Uniform application of chapter — Effect of local
ordinances.
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this
state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority
may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions
of this chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent
with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances which are not in conflict
with this chapter.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 7; C. 1943,
57-7-84; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 9.

Cross-References. — Powers and duties of
all cities, traffic regulations, § 10-8-30.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Hornsby v. Corporation of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles
and Highway Traffic § 19.
C.J.S, — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and effect of

statutes or ordinances forbidding automotive
"cruising" — practice of driving repeatedly
through loop of public roads through city, 87
A.L.R.4th 1110.

41-6-17. Regulatory powers of local authorities — Trafficcontrol device affecting state highway — Necessity of erecting traffic-control devices.
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local authorities, with
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable
exercise of police power, from:
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking;
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or official traffic-control
devices;
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways;
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for use by traffic
moving in one direction under Section 41-6-60;
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in public parks, which supersede Section 41-6-48 regarding speed limits;
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or designating any
intersection or junction of roadways as a stop or yield intersection or
junction;
(g) restricting the use of highways under Section 72-7-408;
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration
and inspection of them, including requiring a registration fee;
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or specified types of
vehicles;
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section 41-6-48;
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41-6-17

MOTOR VEHICLES

(k) requiring written accident reports under Section 4 l~ti IJ
(1) designating no-passing zones under Section 41-6-59,
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of controlled-access roadways by
any class or kind of traffic under Section 41-6-65;
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily traveled streets by any
class or kind of traffic found to be incompatible with the normal and safe
movement of traffic;
(o) establishing minimum speed limits under Subsection 41-6-49(3);
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play streets;
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a highway in a business
district or any designated highway except in a crosswalk under Section
41-6-77;
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings a I unmarked crosswalks undei
Section 41-6-82.10;
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts,
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters, sleds, skateboard^ and
other toy vehicles;
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary oi experimental ordinances as
necessary to cover emergencies or special conditions;
(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from exceeding maximum speed
limits;
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specifically authorized by this
chapter.
(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain any official traffic-control
device at any location which requires the traffic on any state highway to stop
before entering or crossing any intersecting highway unless approval in
writing has first been obtained from the Department of Transportation
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (1), (m),
(n), (p), or (r) is not effective until official traffic-control devices giving notice of
the local traffic ordinances are erected upon or at the entrances to the highway
or part of it affected as is appropriate.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-17, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 242, § 2; 1983, ch. 337, § 1; 1987,
ch. 138, § 10; 1998, ch. 270, § 14.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1979, ch 242, § 2 repealed former § 41-6-17,
as last amended by L 1961, ch 86, § 1, relating
to the regulatory powers of local authorities,

and traffic-control devices, and enacted present
§ 41-6-17
Amendment Notes, — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, substituted
"Section 72-7-408" for "Section 27-12-145* in
Subsection (Dig)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Evidentiary rules
Parking of vehicles
Evidentiary rules.
City had no express or implied power, under
Subsection (l)(a), to make presence of illegally
parked vehicle prima facie evidence that owner
committed or authorized the violation Nasfell

v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249 P2d 50/
(1952)
Parking of vehicles.
A city has no power to pass an ordinance
declaring owners of vehicles prima facie responsible for illegal parking of such vehicles
Nasfell v Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249 P2d
507 (1952)

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-87

(2) This section does not prohibit attaching a trailer or semitrailer to a
bicycle or moped if that trailer or semitrailer has been designed for attachment.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 73; C. 1943,
57-7-150; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 29; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 91.

41-6-87. Operation of bicycle or moped on and use of
roadway — Duties, prohibitions.
(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway at less than the
normal speed of trafBc at the time and place and under the conditions then
existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway
except when:
(a) overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle proceeding in the
same direction;
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or into a private
road or driveway; or
(c) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions including, but not limited
to, fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestrians, animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that make it
unsafe to continue along the right-hand edge. In this subsection, "substandard width lane" means a lane that is too narrow for a bicycle and a vehicle
to travel safely side by side within the lane.
(2) Persons riding bicycles or mopeds upon a roadway may not ride more
than two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the
exclusive use of bicycles. Persons riding two abreast may not impede the
normal and reasonable movement of traffic and on a laned roadway shall ride
within a single lane.
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway,
bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 74; C. 1943,
57-7-151; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 92; 1989, ch. 44, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles
and Highway Traffic § 249.
C.J.S. — 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396(1)
et seq.

A.L.R. — Sufficiency of evidence to raise last
clear chance doctrine m cases of automobile
collision with pedestrian or bicyclist — modern
cases, 9 A.L R.5th 826.
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12.80.070 Riding rules and regulations-Unlawfiil acts
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles:
A. When riding upon a sidewalk to fail to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians and sound a
warning device before overtaking or passing any pedestrian;
B. To ride more than two abreast upon any street;
C. To proceed othei ftitn single \\\v upon any sidewalk;
D. To carry extra passengers or carry any packages, bundles or articles which woi ilcl require
the removal of the hand or hands from the handlebars of the bicycle;
E. To permit the bicycle MJ« li opurdlui i , in ling lt> be lowed by another vehicle or bicycle;
F. To ride any bicycle upon any sidewalk within the central traffic district, as defined in Section
12.04.090 of this title, or its successor, and as described in Schedule 1 of this title, set out
in Chapter 12.104, or its successor, and made a part hereof by reference, or on any other
area where prohibited by signs, provided, however, the foregoing shall not apply to police
officers in the scope and course of their employment;
G. To carry more persons at a time than the number for which the bicycle is designed to carry
on seats firmly attached thereto;
H. When riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to ride upon the sidewalk or any
portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except when making a left turn;
I. To ride upon the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a marked bicycle
lane or when riding upon a one-way street. (Ord. 16-89 § 1, 1989; prior code Title 46, Art.
18 §278)

